1. A serious wastage of human resources and failure to observe one of the first principles of war -- economy of force. This failure derives in part from an inabilty to make war swiftly. It also derives from certain attitudes of mind...

2. A fundamental conservatism and clinging to outworn tradition, an inability to profit from past experiences (owing in part to a refusal to admit past mistakes). It also involves a failure to use or tendency to misuse available technology.

3. A tendency to reject or ignore information which is unpalalable or which conflicts with preconceptions.

4. A tendency to underestimate the enemy and overestimate the capabilities of one's side.

5. Indecisiveness and a tendency to abdicate from the role of decision-maker.

6. An obstinate persistence in a given task despite strong contrary evidence.

7. A failure to exploit a situation gained and a tendency to 'pull punches' rather than push home an attack.

8. A failure to make adequate reconnaisance.

9. A predilection for frontal assaults, often against the enemy's strongest point.

10. A belief in brute force rather than the clever ruse.

11. A failure to make use of surprise or deception.

12. An undue readiness to find scapegoats for military set-backs.

13. A suppression or distortion of news from the front, usually rationalized as necessary for morale or security.

14. A belief in mystical forces -- fate, bad luck. etc.

Although not all of these aspects are applicable to the war in Iraq and the run-up to it, many of them are (I think there'd be little disagreement that we've seen #3,4,6,8,12,13 and 14, and possibly others as well at a tactical level) -- although it's worthwhile to note that some of the trangressions in this instance are the responsibility of the civilian masters of the military (i.e. Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz & company), and not necessarily of the uniformed general staff, which is very often the case.

It will be interesting to see, although distressing at the same time, how many of these behaviors will be exhibited as we are pulled deeper and deeper into Iraq and are unable to extract ourselves because of our alienation of the rest of world who might have provided some relief.


(By the way, although Dixon is a psychologist, a "Reader in Psychology at University College London, and Fellow of the British Royal Psychological Society" at the time at the publication of his book, he did not intend it as, nor did it turn out to be, an attack on the military. Dixon himself served as an officer in the Royal Engineers for 10 years before leaving the British Army to go to college, and he writes in the Preface:

This book is not an attack upon the armed forces nor upon the vast majority of senior military commanders, who, in time of war, succeed in tasks which would make the running of a large commercial enterprise seem child's play by comparison.

It is, however, an attempt to explain how a minority of individuals come to inflict upon their fellow man depths of misery and pain virtually unknown in other walks of life.

Dixon's claim is seconded by British Army Briagdier Shelford Bidwell, who wrote in his Foreword:

I believe that this book should be required reading at all places where future officers are selected, trained or prepared for higher command. Both professional soldiers and the equally useful generation of young academic students of warfare will find new knowledge and valuable insights in this challenging study of how some men in high command may react when under the appalling stresses of war.

I first read this book almost two years ago, not long after the attacks of September 11th. I don't remember specifically what prompted me to do so, or where I saw a citation to it, but certainly the fact that we were preparing for war in Afghanistan was a significant factor in my interest in the subject.)