605) [Citing a familiar "American joke":] In Boston they ask, How much does he know? in New York, How much is he worth? in Philadelphia, Who were his parents?

Mark Twain
(Samuel Clemens)
"What Paul Bourget
Thinks of Us" (1895) [B16]

606) It could probably be shown by facts and figures that there is no distinctly native American criminal class except Congress.

Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens)
Following the Equator (1897) [B16]

607) Noise proves nothing. Often a hen who has laid an egg will cackle as if she had laid an asteroid.

Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens)
Following the Equator (1897) [B16]

608) Truth is the most valuable thing we have. Let us economize it.

Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens)
Following the Equator (1897) [B16]

609) [Man] has imagined a heaven, and has left entirely out of it the supremest of all his delights, the one ecstasy that stands first and foremost in the heart of every individual of his race -- and of ours -- sexual intercourse!

It is as if a lost and perishing person in a roasting desert should be told by a rescuer he might choose and have all longed-for things but one, and he should elect to leave out water!

His heaven is like himself: strange, interesting, astonishing, grotesque. I give you my word, it has not a single feature in it that he actually values. It consists -- utterly and entirely -- of diversions which he cares next to nothing about, here in the earth, yet is quite sure he will like them in heaven. Isn't it curious? Isn't it interesting?

Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens)
Letters from the Earth (1962) [B16]

Sources

[B16] - Bartlett's Familiar Quotations, 16th edition (1993)


Note: "3089/898" is the designation I've given to the project of posting all my collected quotes, excerpts and ideas (3089 of them) in the remaining days of the Bush administration (of which there were 898 left when I began).

As of today, there are 703 days remaining in the administration of the worst American President ever.

 9% / 10% Enterprisers
11% / 13% Social Conservatives
 9% / 10% Pro-Government Conservatives
11% / 13% Upbeats
 9% / 10% Disaffecteds
14% / 15% Conservative Democrats
10% / 10% Disadvantaged Democrats
17% / 19% Liberals
10% /  0% Bystanders

These numbers make it clear why to be successful, a Democratic candidate cannot appeal only to Liberals -- even though we are the largest group, there are not enough of us to carry the day by ourselves. The good news is being the biggest, we have a reasonable expectation that any candidate we support is going to have to back what is basically a liberal agenda. The bad news is that we need the voters in those other groups to win. This is a fact of life in contemporary American politics that too many progressives are blind to.

Even if we were to get all the votes of the Conservative Democrats and Disadvantages Democrats (not necessarily a foregone conclusion), that still gives us only 44% of the registered voters. That's enough for a plurality in a three-way race where a strong third party candidate syphons off some votes, but is not enough to win in a two-way race in most circumstances. We know we're not going to get the Social Conservatives, but there's enough overlap in ideas and agenda with the Disaffecteds, Upbeats, Pro-Government Conservatives and Enterprisers that we can expect to pull some of their vote if the message of the candidate is shaped with them in mind.

This is important stuff. We simply cannot say to those people "Screw you", because that's a recipe for continuing the current disaster we're in. If we had a Parliamentary system it would be different, we could count on our percentage alone being sufficient to get the largest number of votes, and we would put together the coalition that ran the government -- but that's not the way it works here (which is why it's practically impossible for a third party to gain traction).

We should keep these things in mind when we're judging candidates on the basis of how liberal they are. I don't necessarily want the most liberal candidate, I want the most liberal candidate who can win.

[Thanks to Rhea]

Update: This gives rise to a paradox: if you're examining a Presidential candidate with an eye for who to support for the Democratic nomination, and you agree with everything they say on a wide range of fundamental issues, you probably should not support that candidate, since their appeal is likely to be specific to your political typology and not broad enough to carry the election. You should look for people who are in basic agreement with you, but who stray on certain issues, or don't quite come up to your preferred solutions. The best candidate might be the one about whom you can say on most issues: "Yeah, I guess I can live with that."

That means that no matter how many times those "match the candidate to your opinions" quizzes tell me I match up best with Dennis Kucinich, I will not even consider supporting him, since he has no chance to win the election (and, in fact, is not even a serious candidate any more than Biden, Dodd or Vilsack are).

590) Between us and the australopithecine [...] stand a few million years: 100,000, maybe 200,000 generations. That may not sound like much. But it has taken only around 5,000 generations to turn a wolf into a chihuahua - and, at the same time, along a separate line, into a Saint Bernard.

Robert Wright
The Moral Animal (1994)

591) If utilitarians ran the world [...] [t]he courts would ask two questions: (a) Did the defendant commit the crime? and (b) What is the practical effect of punishment - on the criminal's own future behavior, and on the behavior of other would-be criminals?

Robert Wright
The Moral Animal (1994)

592) The enormous volume of mystico-religious bafflegab about atonement and penance and divine justice and the like [in discussions of crime and punishment] is the attribution to higher, detached authority of what is actually a mundane, pragmatic matter: discouraging self-interested competitive acts by reducing their profitability to nil.

Martin Daly and Margo Wilson
Homicide (1988)
quoted by Robert Wright in
The Moral Animal (1994)

593) In games where chance plays a role, we tend to chalk up our losses to the luck of the draw and our victories to cleverness.

Robert Wright
The Moral Animal (1994)

594) No one who actively seeks power is to be trusted. Leaders arise out of example and emulation. If someone is successful at growing corn, he is emulated and to that extent is a leader. If someone knows many verses to a curing chant, he is respected for that accomplishment and his high status as a "singer" is considerable. Politicking, handshaking [...] have no place in traditional Navajo society.

Daniel G. Freedman
"Cross-Cultural Notes on Status Hierarchies" in
Dominance Relations: An Ethological View of Human
Social Conflicts and Social Intercourse (1980),
Donald R. Omark, F.F. Strayer, and D.G. Freedman, eds.
quoted by Robert Wright in
The Moral Animal (1994)

595) Theories are a dime a dozen. Even strikingly elegant theories, which, like the theory of parental investment, seem able to explain much with little, often turn out to be worthless. There is justice in the complaint (from creationists, among others) that some theories about the evolution of animal traits are "just so stories" - plausible, but nothing more. Still, it is possible to separate the merely plausible from the compelling. In some sciences, testing theories is so straightforward that it is only a slight exaggeration (though it is always, in a certain strict sense, an exaggeration) to talk of theories being "proved." In others, corroboration is roundabout - an ongoing, gradual process by which confidence approaches the threshold of consensus, or fails to. Studying the evolutionary roots of human nature, or of anything else, is a science of the second sort. About each theory we ask questions, and the answers nourish belief or doubt or ambivalence.

Robert Wright
The Moral Animal (1994)

Note: "3089/898" is the designation I've given to the project of posting all my collected quotes, excerpts and ideas (3089 of them) in the remaining days of the Bush administration (of which there were 898 left when I began).

As of today, there are 705 days remaining in the administration of the worst American President ever.

• Would anyone really be surprised if shi'ite Iran, which has been supporting various insurgencies for years, was providing a shi'ite militia in a neighboring country with arms? I'd be shocked if they weren't.



• Nevertheless, the "evidence" seems, well, considerably less than overwhelming, especially in light of the recognition by the Pentagon that false evidence was put forward in the run-up to the Iraq invasion.



• The manner in which the "evidence" was presented also speaks against it being credible.



• Even if the evidence were all true, it hardly provides a legitimate casus belli for attacking Iran. It would certainly merit diplomatic action of some sort, but nothing more than that.



• Nations of all kinds, including the United States and its allies (if we have any left), regularly take steps to protect their perceived national interest by arming and assisting other countries, whether formal allies or not, and various insurgencies that they wish to succeed. This is international business as usual.



• Iran would hardly be the only country providing arms to Iraqi militias and insurgents. Do we plan to attack them all, friend and foe alike?

That's it, I can't think of anything more to say about this underwhelming show of "evidence." I'll check the headlines daily to see if we've launched the attack yet.

"At a farewell reception at Blair House for the retiring chief of protocol, Don Ensenat, who was President Bush's Yale roommate, the president shook hands with Washington Life Magazine's Soroush Shehabi. 'I'm the grandson of one of the late Shah's ministers,' said Soroush, 'and I simply want to say one U.S. bomb on Iran and the regime we all despise will remain in power for another 20 or 30 years and 70 million Iranians will become radicalized.'

"'I know,' President Bush answered.

"'But does Vice President Cheney know?' asked Soroush.

"President Bush chuckled and walked away."

[Arnaud de Borchgrave/UPI via Dan Froomkin/WaPo]

The more I think about it, the more I believe that the course of this Administration, especially some of those actions which seemingly defy rational analysis, is well defined as being the outcome of the interaction between Bush's weaknesses of character and Cheney's chararacter flaws, especially his vindictiveness and authoritarianism. Take Cheny's desire to take revenge for the Nixon impeachment, to get back at Saddam for turning against the US, and to strike out at Iran for reasons that aren't quite clear to me (for taking the hostages or for sucking Reagan and Bush into the Iran-Contra scandal?), mix in the radical right-wing ideology which animates the Continuing Revolution, as well as generous quantities of the traditional Republican servicing of their clientele (big business and the rich), spice with neoconservative interventionism and American exceptionalism, run it all through a man who is so unsure of himself that he compensates with bluster and rigidity but still needs to be propped up by a power-behind-the-throne, and you've pretty much got the makings of the Bush-Cheney Administration.

And it really is the Bush-Cheney Adminstration -- both of them are necessary parts for the thing to work. Yes, Cheney is the animating force, I believe, but a Cheney Administration would be a total disaster and most probably would never have gotten into office in the first place, let alone be re-elected. It really does take the ameliorating influence of a frumptious bumpleskin like Bush to put this stuff over and make it even remotely acceptable to the public -- which typically doesn't pay attention to much beyond the surface appearances of things. He's the perfect front man because he's not really perceptive enough to know he's a front man -- he really thinks he's in charge -- but he doesn't have a real desire to actually run things except in the most superficial way, so he doesn't gum up the works all that much.

But still, somewhere in the back of his mind, as I think we can infer from the story above, Bush knows that crossing Cheney would not be a good thing.

Revolutions rarely compromise; compromises are made only to further the strategic design. Negotiation, then, is undertaken for the dual purpose of gaining time to buttress a position (military, political, social, economic) and to wear down, frustrate and harrass the opponent. Few, if any essential concessions are to be expected from the revolutionary side, whose aim is only to create conditions that will preserve the unity of the strategic line and guarantee the development of a "victorious situation."

Whose behavior does this describe to perfection? The Republicans when they were in total control of Congress and the White House. No compromises, no negotiations with Democrats (who were locked out of conference committees and denied the right to bring amendments to the floor), and the use of the Right-Wing Noise Machine, including the Media Held Captive, to grind down the opposition. As the latest, and most ideologically-pure incarnation of the Reagan/Gingrich/Cheney Revolution, the Republicans followed this playbook to the letter. They were (and are) running a revolution against Enlightenment values, the post-war liberal state and the international system which supports and protects it. Like good revolutionaries, they knew that when they got ahold of power, they had to use it quickly, decisively, and ruthlessly.

I haven't been reading the blogs much lately (deliberately), but I nonetheless sense that the progressive blogosphere is disappointed with the actions of the Democrats in Congress to this point. This, I think, was inevitable. Having been crushed underfoot by the Bush Administration and a radical anti-liberal Congress, lefty bloggers want their newly elected representative to behave as the Republicans did, not necessarily as payback, but to move the restoration of the liberal state, and all its incumbent rights and privileges, forward in fast gear. That, however, would require that the Democrats behave in a revolutionary manner, as did the Republicans, which is a problem because the restoration of the liberal state doesn't represent a revolutionary move, it's essentially the restoration of the status quo ante, the conditions that prevailed before the Republican war against the liberal state began. Democrats can't behave like revolutionaries because, for better or worse, they are (at least in relation to the ideology of the right-wing) the establishment, and, as good liberals, they believe in compromise, negotiation and bipartisanship. To expect them to behave otherwise is unrealistic -- they are not radicals

But that's OK, I think, because if the progressive blogosphere is disenchanted, it simply means that their expectations were too high. Taking control of Congress is necesssary for undoing the damage of the Bush-Cheney years (and the Reagan and Gingrich years as well, lest we forget), but not sufficient to do so -- we absolutely have to have the White House as well, which we will in January of 2009. At that time, with almost the full power of the Federal government behind us (excepting the Federal court system), we should be able to make some headway. In the meantime, I think that Pelosi and Reid are doing a pretty decent job, and, since we're basically in a holding action for a while, I'm willing to give them some freedom to maneuvre as they see fit. As long as we don't actually lose ground, we're pretty much OK.

And who wrote the passage above, which describes so well the modus operandi of the Radical Right-Wing Republicans? It comes from a work called Yu Chi Chan, which translates as "Guerilla Warfare," written by Mao Zedong.

• be easily visually distinguishable from a quarter; and


• be easily tactilely distinguishable from a quarter.

That's it, such simple requirements, but it's unclear, judging from the news story and the photos and sketches I've seen, whether they'll be met. The coin is "golden" and that could be helpful in setting it apart from its cheaper brethren by sight (but it depends on just how "golden" it is -- after all, Sacagawea was gold-colored, but still didn't go over), but since it's round, rather than, say, octagonal or dodecagonal, and only a "little larger" than a quarter, it may not be so easy to distinguish by feel.

The one thing the coin may have going for it, tactilely speaking, is that it has edge lettering -- letering around the outside edge of the coin, which is (presumably) raised and not incised. Depending on how raised this is, and how easy it is to feel it with the fingers, the coin may have an advantage. If you can reach into your pocket, and feel the edge of the coin, and quickly know that you're pulling out a dollar rather than a quarter, well, that may give the new coin a clear edge on the old ones.

So, I'm feeling my way around this, but I think I can finger the factor that will determine the success of the new dollar coin: whether or not you can easily feel the edge lettering. I'd put money on it (if I was a betting man).

Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks -- political, economic, social, and military -- to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of society's networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy's political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy -- measured in decades rather than months or years.

[...]

Not only is 4GW the only kind of war America has ever lost, we have done so three times: Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. This form of warfare has also defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria and the USSR in Afghanistan. It continues to bleed Russia in Chechnya and the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in other countries against the al-Qaeda network. The consistent defeat of major power by much weaker fourth-generation opponents makes it essential to understand this new form of warfare and adapt accordingly.

There is nothing mysterious about 4GW. Like all wars, it seeks to change the enemiy's political position. Like all wars, it uses available weapons systems to achieve that end. Like all wars, it reflects the society it is part of. Like all previous generations of war, it has evolved in consonance with society as a whole. It evolved because practical people solved specific problems related to their fights against much more powerful enemies. Practitioners created it, nurtured it, and have continued its development and growth. Faced with enemies they could not possibly beat using conventional war, they sought a different path.

Col. Thomas X. Hammes, USMC
The Sling and the Stone: On Warfare in the 21st Century (2004)

I've just started reading this book, and I'll be very interested to find out what Col. Hammes has to say -- especially what he says about how best to fight against the techniques of fourth-generation war with our, essentially, third generation forces. (I guess that the old saw about generals always beeing ready to fight the last war can be extended to say that they're also always ready for the last generation of war, at least until the new generation becomes normalized.)

Speculating, since I've only begin the book, I wonder if the key to fighting against 4GW warriors isn't held in Mao's saying about the people being the water in which guerillas swim?* If what he says is the case, and it seems clearly to be true, then isn't is the most important thing to somehow change the water? Not to "drain the swamp" as some would want -- because unless you're fighting your war strictly for economic, colonial or territorial reasons, draining the swamp is the equivalent of destroying the village in order to save it -- but changing the water by reducing the people's support for the insurgents. You don't have to get them to love you -- that's much too daunting a task: if they were prone to love you they'd have done it from the start -- you simply have to get them to see some advantage to not helping the insurgents fight you.

That's hard when "the people" are the insurgents, but I would suppose that there are people are are actively involved, people who actively support them, and then a greater mass of people who can take it either way, depending on the circumstances. It's those your efforts should be aimed at.

And what efforts? Well, the winning of "hearts and minds" -- but a true and effective program, not forcibly relocating people for security reasons and then giving them a new cow to influence them to love you. No, you have to find out what they want and give it to them -- help them on their terms. Chances are they'll say something along the lines of food, clean water, security, work, safety, electricity, infrastructure repair, which means basically your task is to undo the damages of war or the lingering deficiences of the society you went there to disrupt in the first place.

If that sounds like "nation building," it is, and the Bush Administration's expressed contempt for the concept before 9/11 happened gives a good hint why they've done such a piss-poor job in Iraq -- not only do they not really understand the task that was before them, but they had no inclination to do it anyway.

Obviously that kind of work is not done primarily by the military -- although they do have to take the lead on security and safety, without which the others can't be achieved -- but has to be done in conjunction with other governmental agencies, NGOs, humanitarian organizations, the UN and other international agencies, and so on. They need to be out there rebuilding and getting systems back into place, so that people start to rely on them again. When that happens, the people won't be grateful (you're only, after all, providing the capacity for them to get the minimum of what is needed for survival, which was your responsibility as the disruptor in the first place) but when the systems go down they'll be annoyed, and when you let it be known via your system of propaganda (in the good sense of the word, purveying truthful information which is helpful to your side) operating through friendly locals, that they went down because of insurgent action -- well, the people may take out their annoyance on the insurgents instead of you. Multiply that and you've started the process of restricting the operational capacity of the insurgency.

(Of course, I'm interested in this subject because of Iraq, but, unfortunately, it's most probably much too late for any of this there -- if it even has any validity, being my own speculation and not the ideas of Col. Hammes. If these techniques were going to be used there, they would have to have been put into effect at the very beginning of the occupation, immediately after the fall of Saddam's regime. The necessary specially-trained troops and civilian workers should have been ready to come in right on the heels of the front-line troops, to instantly show the people that work was being done right away to put things to right.)

My other thought was about the nature of the military operations. It seems to me that the primary goal is to as soon as possible reduce the scope of the operation from fighting to policing, and that means making the public face of your forces, as much as possible, non-threatening. Obviously, to begin with, security and safety will require fighting forces, but as things come under control, the task should be handed off to other (again, specially-trained) troops who can police without being as intrusive or threatening to the people. Their task should be to train their own replacements from the local population as soon as possible, and turn the task over to them bit by bit.

Clearly, you don't send the front-line troops away immediately -- you keep them in reserve, ready to fight, when necessary, at hot spots which can't be dealt with by the policing troops. The total aim is for the public military presence to be as light, agile, non-invasive (no pun intended) and responsive as possible, but with a strong and forceful presence backing it up: the chain-mail fist in the velvet glove.

But, as I said, I would think that you've got to start at the beginning for any of this to be effective, and we didn't do that. Just after 9/11, I wrote that our best policy was to "bomb them with butter, bribe them with hope."

We *must* act as nation-builders, or at least facilitators so that nations can rebuild themselves. We should do this not out of guilt, [but] simply as a matter of enlightened self-interest.

That's still a fairly good description of the kind of techniques I'm suggesting here.

Will Col. Hammes agree? Maybe not. Probably, being a trained military analyst, he'll understand the problem in a very different way and have very different solutions. I'm looking forward to finding out.

______________

[*] "The people are like water and the army is like fish," in Aspects of China's Anti-Japanese Struggle (1948).